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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The crafters of the United Nations Charter were not able to foresee the world that would 
come into being after World War II.  Interstate conflict has sharply declined in the last 60 years 
(Zacher, 2001), whereas intrastate conflict has risen dramatically in that same time period, with 
at least 84 intrastate conflicts fought since 1960, and that number rising after 1989.  The Charter 
was not designed to deal directly with intrastate conflict; most of the mechanisms are instead 
intended for preventing interstate conflict.  The main mechanism that has evolved for the 
maintenance of international peace and security has been the mechanism of peacekeeping, where 
the United Nations acts as a neutral third party as either an observer, or, more recently, an active 
partner in seeking and maintaining peace.  This idea of peacekeeping is not explicitly laid out in 
the Charter; instead it has grown by fits and starts since 1948 and is now usually the main answer 
with respect to intrastate conflict in the 21st century.1   
The United Nations has frequently not been able to fulfill the Security Council’s 
mandates with respect to troop strength, sufficient training for troops, and supplies due to the 
changes that have taken place in the peacekeeping system, the roles of forces in peacekeeping, 
and the types of conflicts that peacekeepers are sent into.  The main issue here is the fact that the 
UN Charter was designed for and structured to combat interstate conflict, while modern 
peacekeeping missions are instead aimed at resolving intrastate conflicts.  For instance, the 
United Nations has called for 19,315 peacekeepers for the mission in Darfur (along with 
additional police, volunteers and the like); however, the actual number of peacekeepers currently 
deployed for this mission is merely 12, 737, despite the fact that the United Nations Security 
                                                        
1 Although this has increasingly not been the case, the UN, at the very least, attempts to engage in neutrality and 
impartial peacekeeping. 
2 
Council (UNSC) made the call for these peacekeepers in 2007. 2  The number of peacekeeping 
missions that the United Nations has embarked on has skyrocketed since 1989, with only 15 
peacekeeping missions undertaken up to 1989, and 48 peacekeeping missions deployed during 
and after 1989.3  The UN peacekeeping system never has been and is still not set up to deal with 
such massive numbers of peacekeepers.4  The United Nations has had serious issues with the 
logistical side of peacekeeping as well, failing to supply peacekeepers in the field, with the sad 
truth that the UN has been unable to quickly and effectively procure food, equipment and 
ammunition for its peacekeepers in the field as the UN only has one logistics station in Brindisi, 
Italy and no effective method for rapid deployment. 5 
More and more frequently the call comes for the UN Security Council to outsource 
peacekeeping; i.e. contract out specific peacekeeping duties to private military companies 
(PMCs) or private security companies (PSCs).6  Not only have Member states called for this, but 
public figures have called for this as well; UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali called for this in An 
Agenda for Peace and Madeline Albright, former US Secretary of State, calling for the 
international community to equip and train units willing to volunteer in advance for peace 
enforcement (Albright, 2003).  The UNSC, however, has never shown any interest in taking 
peacekeepers from PSCs or PMCs.7   
This paper will therefore explore a question that has not been answered in the literature: 
would it be possible for a non-state actor (NSA), perhaps a non-profit organization, to donate 
                                                        
2 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm. 
3 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf 
4 The UN peacekeeping system has swollen from dealing with approximately 20,000 peacekeepers in 1989 to the 
current number of 93, 481 peacekeepers. 
5 http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGUSA20071129001 
6 PMCs are companies that specialize in heavy military operations w/ corresponding heavy weaponry and mostly 
military training.  PSCs are companies that specialize in less armed roles, i.e. police, guard duty, etc. 
7 For a concise article on the issues inherent in outsourcing UN peacekeeping and a call for said outsourcing, see: 
http://www.metimes.com/Security/2009/02/27/dogs_of_war_outsourcing_peacekeeping/50d5/ 
3 
peacekeepers to a Member State who would in turn donate those peacekeepers to the UNSC 
under the provisions of Article 43?8  In the same token, could that non-state actor accept the 
constraints placed upon it by the Member State in question?  Could the UN Security Council 
actually take peacekeepers from a non-state actor?  Due to the fact that this scenario is at this 
point hypothetical, this paper will first explore cases that might help to highlight the issues at 
hand, followed by an analysis of these issues with the case studies and a thought experiment on 
exactly what conditions would be needed and how/if they could be met. This paper could 
therefore be considered a heuristic probe: if conditions X, Y and Z are available, is there a 
chance of event Q taking place?   This paper will also cover the conditions needed to be met with 
regards to differing types of peacekeeping operations; i.e. preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, post-conflict reconstruction and peace enforcement.9  This paper finds that there is 
possibility for overlap with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking, but 
the possibility of overlap for post-conflict reconstruction and peace enforcement are low to non-
existent at this time. 
                                                        
8 Article 43 deals with the signing of special agreements which deal with the numbers and types of forces, their 
degree of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.  This is the 
only method wherein the United Nations is allowed to take peacekeepers directly into the UN peacekeeping system.  
Although this was only supposed to be intended for Chapter VII operations, this has been expanded greatly since 
1948 to fill all peacekeeping missions. 
9 Doyle, pgs. 10-11. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although there is no specific literature on the subject in question, it is possible to look at 
related bodies of literature to gain at least some partial insights into the question at hand.  To 
discuss the idea of a Member state actively using a non-state actor’s peacekeepers, the literature 
review will discuss: 
 
a. A history of the rise and decline of mercenary use by states in the Westphalian 
system, and the resurgence of mercenary use by states after the end of the Cold War 
and in the 21st century, 
b. The outsourcing and delegating of Member state tasks (both military and civilian 
support missions) to non-state actors as documented in the literature,10 
c. The development of international legal institutions with respect to sovereignty, non-
state actors and their role on peacekeeping and 
d. Trends in weak states and civil conflicts with respect to the privatization of security in 
both weak states and civil conflicts. 
 
Each of these in itself does very little to explain the possibility of a Member state actively 
using a non-state actor’s peacekeepers; however, each of these taken together can help shed light 
on the possibilities inherent in a Member state accepting peacekeepers from a NSA.   
 
 
                                                        
10 Examples include election monitoring, logistical capacity, guard duties, hardware repair/maintenance and the like. 
5 
Mercenary Use in the Westphalian System 
The Sovereignty Norm (and Violations Thereof) 
 After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,11 which created the notion of state sovereignty as 
a global milestone, large numbers of interstate wars were fought; states did meddle with the 
internal affairs of other states, and most countries were unable to exercise full control over their 
territories.  Despite the violations inherent in the Westphalian structure, the general idea of state 
sovereignty is considered a keystone of the international system, so much so that it is encoded in 
international law via the United Nations Charter: “The Organization is based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of all its Members”.12 
Krasner covers four specific types of violations of Westphalian sovereignty: 
1) Conventions wherein a sovereign state agrees to some external scrutiny over said 
state’s internal affairs;13 
2) Contracts, where a sovereign state signs an agreement between two or more sovereign 
states or a non-state international actor that is mutually acceptable to all parties 
involved;14 
3) Coercion where one state threatens sanctions against another state unless the targeted 
state agrees to compromise internal autonomy,15 and; 
4) Imposition, where a sovereign state simply imposes its will on another weaker state.16 
                                                        
11 The Peace of Westphalia produced three important elements with respect to sovereignty: territorial integrity, the 
equality of states in the international system and non-intervention by external sources in the internal affairs of a 
state. 
12 United Nations Charter, Article 2, Section 1. 
13 Krasner, pg. 124. 
14 Krasner, pg. 128. 
15 Krasner, pg. 136. 
16 Ibid. 
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All of these situations violate Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, history is replete of 
examples of all four of these specific scenarios.  One of the main examples of sovereignty 
violation with respect to the United Nations system deals with Chapter VII enforcement missions 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council, wherein the UNSC has the ability to enforce 
sanctions (a form of coercion),17 and even the ability to invade and occupy another Member State 
(a form of imposition).18  For the purposes of this paper, the main violation that will be explored 
will be the idea of contracts between two or more states and/or a non-state international actor.  
This can include bilateral/multilateral treaties, contracts signed between states and International 
Organizations (IOs) and also contracts signed between states and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) or other non-state actors.   Contracts are signed on behalf of Member 
states which give both parties involved in the contract some benefit.  Due to the fact that this 
signing allows Member to lease sovereignty, this violation of Westphalian sovereignty has 
important ramifications for the central question of this paper as this clearly shows that states 
have no problem with violating Westphalian sovereignty if/when it suits their interests, as it 
clearly would in the case of a mutually beneficial contract between a NSA and a Member state. 
 
The Norm of Nation-State’s Use of Mercenaries 
Before the 19th century, the majority of a state’s army was actually composed of hired 
mercenaries (Thomson, 1990).  State power was viewed in almost exclusive terms of hard 
power; i.e. the number of troops that could be fielded, the number of ships in that state’s navy, 
etc.  To field the maximum number of troops, states would either a) directly enlist individuals in 
                                                        
17 United Nations Charter, Article 41. 
18 United Nations Charter, Article 42. 
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their armies, b) purchase or lease entire army units or c) subsidize another state’s army.19  Not 
only were mercenaries hired in large numbers by states engaging in warfare, hiring foreign 
mercenaries was considered the norm with respect to how states fought each other; states would 
contract out military work for a specified amount of money and those two armies would fight 
(Thomson, 1990), (Avant, 2000). 
 The late 18th and 19th centuries saw a change in this norm; i.e. the rise of nationalism and 
also the rise of the idea of the state having the monopoly over the use of force (Thomson, 1990).  
States began this transition by first tying foreign military service with the loss of the national’s 
citizenship,20 followed by the transition of the citizenry’s ideas of being a citizen;21 i.e. serving 
exclusively in the citizen’s national army, not the army of any other.22  The institutionalization of 
new state authority with claims to both municipal and international law led to the decline of 
mercenarism.  By marrying the norm of “citizen-armies” with the idea that mercenary armies are 
not internationally condoned, the need for and hiring of mercenaries declined.  By the middle of 
the twentieth century, only eighteen states had members from other states in their armies; most of 
these being colonial leftovers.23   
 
Resurgence of the Mercenary Norm after the End of the Cold War 
During the Cold War, local conflicts were held in check by superpower rivalry; in 
essence, the elites in the situations in question simply turned to one of the superpowers for 
support, weaponry, etc.  With the end of the Cold War this easy source of power dried up, 
leaving elites in “battleground” states with nowhere to turn for effective military support, as the 
                                                        
19 Thomson, pg. 24.   
20 Thomson, pg. 41. 
21 Thomson, pg. 43.  Thomson states that nation-states passed laws stripping citizenship of nationals serving in 
foreign militaries, leading to a re-evaluation of citizens with respect to the definition of citizenry. 
22 Ibid.   
23 Thomson, pg. 28. 
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superpowers had propped up regimes that were supportive to one or the other superpower.  
PMCs filled this gap by providing those services, effectively allowing small states to field battle-
tested and technologically advanced militaries.  With the end of the Cold War, a number of 
state’s armed forces units were demobilized (as in the United States) or simply turned private (as 
in the former Soviet Union and South Africa).24  In both situations, these former military units 
had the expertise to engage in effective military actions but lacked the funding to do so.  
Therefore, the logical outcome was for these forces to go into business for themselves, leading to 
the proliferation of PMCs such as Executive Outcomes, Blackwater/Xe and Sandline.   
It has been noted in the literature that every major United States military operation in the 
world since the end of the Cold War has been supported by significant and growing levels of 
PMC support.25  The exact number of PMCs and PSCs are not generally known; however, they 
have been noticed by the United States and UK as growing since the 1990s, with a larger number 
of them taking on more missions in Member states and earning larger amounts of profits,26 with 
these PMCs being hired by upwards of 30 Member states or rebel groups.27  The vast majority 
(specifically 89.5%) of these missions by PMCs took place after the end of the Cold War. 28  It 
must also be stated that most of the PMCs and PSCs in question are in the habit of taking citizens 
of other countries for employment in their companies.29  PMCs and PSCs are valued worldwide 
                                                        
24 With respect to South Africa, this is exactly how Executive Outcomes came into being; entire former South 
African military units after being demobilized simply filled out corporate paperwork and became contractors-for-
hire. 
25 Singer, pg. 188. 
26 2002 UK Green Paper, pg. 12, accessible at: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf4/fco_pdf_privatemilitarycompanies 
27 Ibid, Annex A. 
28 Ibid, Annex A; although this covers only Africa, 9 of these PMCs were in Africa before the end of the Cold War, 
77 after the Cold War. 
29 Blackwater/XE, Sandline and Executive Outcomes all state on their websites that they have “strict application 
standards”; however, one of them is not citizenship in the home country of that PMSC (US for Blackwater, UK for 
Sandline and South Africa for Executive Outcomes) 
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at $165 billion and are forecast to grow 8% annually for the foreseeable future (Abrahamsen & 
Williams, 2009).   
Due to these issues, it is logical to assume that because Member states have allowed for 
this monopoly of force to become diluted, it stands to reason that IOs that are specifically made 
up of Member states (such as the UN) would also allow this monopoly to dilute in its dealings 
with NSAs.   
 
Outsourcing/Delegating Tasks from Member States to NGO/Non-State Actors 
This represents the opposite side of the equation: even if a Member state was able to take 
peacekeepers from a NSA, could an IO such as the UN actually take those peacekeepers?  After 
all, if peacekeepers could only flow from the NSA to the Member state, but not from the 
Member state to the UN, there would be little point in this discussion.  As stated in the previous 
section, recently Member states have contracted military duties to non-state actors, specifically 
PMCs.  Because of this, the unrestricted access to military services, ushered in by the rise of the 
privatized military industry has clearly enhanced the role of non-state groups.30  Even the most 
powerful military on the planet has contracted out a large amount of its military duties to these 
PMCs, clearly showing a breach in the Weberian monopoly of force.  The United Nations has 
taken note of the increased use of PMCs.  Indeed, the Special Rapporteur for the Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003 stated that after examining the role of PMCs in the field and the questions 
raised by Member States on the question of PMCs: 
“Hence the need for a debate on the role of the State with respect to the use of 
force ‘so as to reach a common understanding on the respective duties and 
responsibilities of the different State and non-State actors in the current context, 
and their respective obligations for the promotion and protection of human rights’, 
                                                        
30 Singer, pg. 212. 
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the core issue being to identify ‘who is entitled to legitimacy in the use of force in 
the current political and security climate.  This could conceivably lead to ‘a 
fundamental revamping or the total revocation of the UN 1989 Convention on 
mercenaries’ and also yield ‘a useful outcome for the United Nations itself with 
respect to effective maintenance of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
mandates.’” (Ghebali, 2009) 
 
The United Nations, along with others, has clearly realized that the question of 
what entities in the international system have the ability to engage in the use of force is 
not a self-evident answer.  That there is discussion on this issue gives leverage to the idea 
that outsourcing peacekeeping to a NSA is therefore theoretically possible.   
 
The Development of International Legal Institutions with Respect to Sovereignty,  
Non-State Actors and their Role on Peacekeeping 
 The entire UN system is based around a treaty which attempts to produce an international 
system based around the rule of international law, specifically under Article 103, making all 
other international treaties subservient to the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945).  In essence, by 
signing this treaty, Member states have voluntarily given up part of their sovereignty, especially 
when it deals with international peace and security.31  This development of the norm of 
international law has led to a slow encroachment of international and supranational institutions 
on the classic definition of sovereignty. 
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are both 
clear examples of this checking of sovereignty.  The ECJ has the ability to interpret law with 
respect to the EU, may review the validity of an act of Community law, and its judgments are 
                                                        
31 Of course this is not always entirely true or accurate, but international law is more often than not followed by all 
players involved. Article 24 of the Charter specifically states that international peace and security is the Security 
Council’s job; NOT the job of the Member states. 
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binding on all members of the EU.32  The ICC is a widely encompassing legal institution that can 
try individuals on four specific counts: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and 
the Crime of Aggression (Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 
1998).  With respect to sovereignty, each Member that has signed the ICC statute has agreed to: 
1) The Court shall have international legal personality.  It shall also have such legal capacity 
as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes. 
2) The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the 
territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other 
State.33 
Yet another example of this growth is UNCLOS, the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.34  This treaty produces a regime known as the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) that has the ability to distribute seabed mining royalties.35  In essence, this treaty gives this 
international regime the ability to tax and regulate a resource, an ability that is classically 
considered to be the sole domain of states.  Any disputes are taken care of by binding arbitration; 
however if necessary the option to present the case to the UNSC is present as a last resort in the 
treaty.   
 Also, it is possible to look at the impact that NSAs have had with respect to international 
organizations, specifically the United Nations.  Although NGOs are only mentioned once in the 
United Nations Charter, they have steadily increased their representation and influence 
throughout the entire UN system.36  Specifically, the UN has outsourced more and more of its 
legal and political functions to NGOs in the field, such as election monitoring and the like.  
                                                        
32 Description of the ECJ’s powers and abilities: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/presentation 
33 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998: Article 4, Sections 1 and 2. 
34 UNCLOS full treaty text found at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm 
35 Ibid, Article XI. 
36 UN Charter, Article 71. 
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Indeed, the UN has stated on many occasions that the job of peacekeeping cannot be done in the 
field without NGO support.  The UN has also specifically granted NGOs the ability to be first 
responder units with respect to disaster relief, showing again how far NGOs have come with 
respect to NSAs. 
 These examples show that the international legal institutions that have been put into place 
over the last 50 years have also contributed to what could be considered an erosion of state 
sovereignty.  This also has led to the creation of an international legal culture where not only 
Member states are checked with respect to their actions, but also NSAs are increasingly being 
held accountable for their actions in the international system, giving one less reason for Member 
states to refuse accepting peacekeepers from NSAs.   
 
Trends in Weak States and Civil Conflicts with Respect to the Privatization of Security in 
both Weak States and Civil Conflicts 
 After the end of the Cold War, a number of states that were previously propped up by 
either one of the superpowers lost their funding and equipment from these poles.37  To 
compensate for this, both rebel groups and weak states hired PMCs and PSCs to guard 
dignitaries, train militaries, protect resources, or engage in all-out war with the opposite side 
(Singer, 2001).  These weak states justified the hiring of these companies under the UN Charter, 
specifically the idea that hiring these companies was conducive to their inherent right to defense. 
38  With the rise of intrastate conflict and the decline of interstate war since the Second World 
War, weak states were no longer able to effectively control the territories that they nominally 
claimed (Zacher, 2001).  This led to governments hiring these companies to engage in the work 
                                                        
37 Somalia, Sudan, Liberia and others come readily to mind with respect to the Cold War pullout. 
38 United Nations Charter, Article 51. 
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that the state was no longer able to effectively do for itself (Singer, 2001).  This shows that the 
use of PMCs for defense and internal security is justified under international law, which is the 
exact use that peacekeepers would be used for if used in the current context of UN peacekeeping.  
Due to the fact that these states have used international norms and legal instruments to justify 
their leasing of the use of force to NSAs, this represents another piece of evidence that shows 
that a Member state accepting donated peacekeepers is not impossible.   
As can be seen, there is a great deal of literature showing that the erosion of state 
sovereignty and the outsourcing of both military and non-military functions to non-state actors 
are historically precedented, with a lapse and resurgence documented above.  This also shows 
that the concept of outsourcing military and military-related tasks to non-state actors has not only 
occurred a great number of times, but also has a large background of past actions.  It is clear that 
there is ample evidence to show that a NSA-Member state partnership is not only theoretically 
possible, it is probable.   
14 
CHAPTER 3. 
GENERAL SETS OF CONDITIONS WHICH A NON-STATE ACTOR AND A 
MEMBER STATE WOULD REQUIRE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS 
This section will identify the sets of conditions required for a Member State to accept 
volunteer peacekeepers and the conditions that a NSA (from here throughout the paper, NSA 
will refer to non-profit NSAs; i.e. NSAs that do not operate for profits unless specifically stated 
otherwise) would need to be able to donate said peacekeepers to a Member State:  the “carrots” 
and “sticks” required on both sides of the equation to engage in mutually beneficial negotiations.  
These are general conditions that will be refined by the case study data in the next section.   
 
For-Profit vs. Non-Profit NSAs 
Although the literature review and the case studies cover for-profit NSAs, it would be 
logical to look at the advantages and disadvantages between for-profit NSAs and non-profit 
NSAs, as the ultimate aim of this paper is to examine non-profit NSA interaction with Member 
states.   
 For-profit NSAs, first and foremost, have what can only be termed a stigma attached to 
them, being called “soldiers of fortune” and/or “guns for hire”.  The UN has specifically stated 
that they will not work with mercenaries.  Although for-profit NSAs have been used for state 
purposes, no for-profit NSA has been used under the aegis of an international organization such 
as the UN with respect to military/security matters.39  Yet another issue is the matter of cost: who 
would pay for a for-profit NSA to engage in peacekeeping operations?  The UN as stated above 
will not work with for-profit NSAs, and would most certainly not pay them to engage in said 
                                                        
39 This does not include PSCs, as PSCs have been used by the UN to guard convoys, etc.  The UN and other IOs 
have never used PMCs to engage in military work. 
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activities.  Even if a very poor country wished to use an NSA to fulfill its contractual obligations, 
it would be doubtful if the UN would agree to the use of those forces and would therefore not 
pay for their deployment and/or use.  For-profit NSAs are, by definition, for profit, thereby 
forcing them to work to maximize profit so as to pay dividends to shareholders, like any 
company.  This could be either an advantage or disadvantage; the advantage being that the for-
profit NSA will have a clear motivation to engage in the work done (i.e. money) while the 
disadvantage is specifically how to ensure that the for-profit NSA is not skimming money off the 
top, under-equipping peacekeepers, and the like.  For-profit NSAs are also usually not publicly 
traded, thereby making them non-transparent and as will be seen later, non-accountable.  Indeed, 
Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, specifically stated the obvious with respect to 
accountability and transparency to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee: 
when asked where all of the federal funding to Blackwater was going, Prince responded: “We’re 
a private company, and there’s a key word there – private”.40 
Non-profit NSAs, on the other hand, have a different set of advantages and 
disadvantages.  Non-profit NSAs are not motivated primarily by money; instead, they are 
motivated by their beliefs.  This of course can be either a massive advantage or disadvantage: the 
Red Cross is world renowned for its devotion to its beliefs, but then again so is Al-Qaeda.  
Because of this, non-profit NSAs will attempt to promote their beliefs, not their profit.  Most 
Member states that support non-profits in their tax codes force these non-profits to publically 
transmit their financial records; this leads non-profit NSAs to be far more transparent in financial 
dealings as opposed to for-profit NSAs.41  This also makes the non-profit NSA more 
accountable: the non-profit must know at all times where all resources are allocated and 
                                                        
40 The Washington Times, October 3rd, 2007.  Page A02. 
41 501(c)3 US tax codes explicitly states that any organization filing under that tax code makes public its financial 
records at all times and must publish said records yearly. 
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expended at; otherwise they will lose tax-exempt status.  Non-profit NSAs would also not be 
funded by the UN or the Member states; it would be privately funded to maintain neutrality and 
accountability.   
 
General Conditions Required by Member State 
Here a rhetorical question is in order: what conditions would the Member state insist on if 
it were to engage a NSA in negotiations?  The Member state, at the very minimum, would 
require an NSA to agree to be bound by its national laws and the ability to have some influence 
on how the NSA’s peacekeepers were trained.  The Member state would also be forced to make 
absolutely sure that the NSA was held accountable for its actions; due to the fact that the 
Member state had hired said NSA for a specific job, if the NSA made a mistake the NSA would 
need to be held accountable so that the Member state would have the ability to disavow itself of 
the NSA’s mistakes.  The Member state would almost certainly require the ability to cancel or 
opt-out of a contract at specific intervals.  The NSA would be able to offer the Member State de 
facto access to the Security Council under the provisions of Article 44. 42 This is not a voting 
seat; however, this simply allows the Member State in question to participate in discussions of 
where its peacekeepers are deployed when the UNSC decides on the international use force.  The 
Member state, however, might not choose to use Article 44 for a seat; instead, the Member state 
might simply see enhanced, effective peacekeeping as the main payoff for this transaction.  A 
number of Member States also consider peacekeeping to be in line with their foreign policy: the 
Scandinavian Members come immediately to mind.  For instance, Norway’s foreign minister 
stated: 
                                                        
42 Article 44 states that when the UNSC decides to use force the Member (if it is not already represented on the 
Council) who donates armed forces from special agreements signed under Article 43 may participate in decisions of 
the Security Council concerning the employment of that Member’s armed forces. 
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“Norway’s engagement in peacekeeping is based on its interest in upholding certain basic 
principles of international conduct which are of vital importance to small states everywhere”.43  
For small Member states of the UN system, participating in peacekeeping reinforces two key 
concepts for small states in the UN system: 
1) Peacekeeping helps to strengthen the rule of international law, and 
2) Peacekeeping promotes peaceful settlement of disputes.44 
Therefore, the logical conclusion here is that small states would have the most to 
gain from entering negotiations with a NSA to help reinforce the two major objectives of 
small state diplomacy as stated above.  Small states have a vested interest in the rule of 
international law as international law could be considered the best defense for small 
states which have little to no ability to defend themselves from attack.  The same could 
be held true with respect to peaceful settlements of disputes.  A NSA that was able to 
peacefully settle disputes in accordance with international law would dovetail effectively 
with any small state in the UN system’s foreign policy.  This therefore leads to some of 
the questions asked in the case studies; i.e. how accountability is dealt with and what 
stipulations the Member state would need to accede to. 
 A Member state would want an ideal non-profit NSA that would have the following 
features: 
1) Full transparency and accountability, 
2) Well-trained, well disciplined peacekeepers ready for rapid deployment, 
3) Fully equipped and supplied peacekeepers, 
4) The least cost possible for these peacekeepers45 and 
                                                        
43 Jakobsen, pg. 20. 
44 Jakobsen, pg. 19. 
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5) Neutrality and impartiality with respect to all Member states; i.e. the NSA would not 
be supported monetarily by any individual Member state. 
These five conditions would make up what could be considered the “perfect” NSA to 
enter into a long-term partnership with a Member state.   
 
General Conditions Required by NSA 
A NSA would require a Member state which was fully integrated in the international 
community, a Member of the United Nations, and the understanding that international law is the 
basis for any arrangement involving a NSA and a Member state.  The NSA would also require 
that the Member state and the NSA share the same commitment to peacekeeping and other 
international norms.  The NSA would also require access to the UNSC through a process known 
as the Arria formula, wherein a NSA has the ability to informally consult with the UNSC (Global 
Policy Forum, 2003).  The NSA would also need the ability to opt-out of a contract with a 
Member state in case the Member state’s objectives steer clear of the NSA’s objectives.  For 
instance, it could be possible for an election in a Member state to change the foreign policy of a 
Member state such that the NSA’s goals and the Member state’s goals are no longer 
synonymous.  The Member state could give the non-state actor is the ability to, at the very 
minimum, increase the prestige and clout of that non-state actor.   
 
General Conditions Required by the UN 
The United Nations is a system devoted to serving its Member states; as such, Member 
states dictate the terms under which the system operates.  The UN has rapidly expanded its 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
45 The most ideal case would be no cost peacekeepers; i.e. the non-profit NSA supported by private donors and 
foundations with no charge to the Member state.  This would include training and any salaries paid to the volunteers. 
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peacekeeping missions since the late 90’s, so much so that the system is becoming overworked 
and not being able to pull in the resources to get the job done.  Michael Doyle goes so far as to 
say, “At this point, the UN is so desperate for troops and peacekeepers they will take just about 
anything”.46  It must also be remembered that if these peacekeepers are donated by a Member 
state, the UN could possibly refuse these, but that would be the equivalent of refusing the troops 
of a Member state, which if the NSA set up the contract with an appropriate Member state, this 
issue would not be even considered.47 
 The United Nations would also require two specific conditions with respect to 
peacekeepers:  
1) The Degree of Force mandated by the Security Council for use by peacekeepers and 
2) The Rules of Engagement under which peacekeepers are allowed to operate. 
The degree of force is what chapter of the United Nations Charter the peacekeeping 
operation is operating under, stretching from preventive diplomacy which is considered a 
standard Chapter VI mandate to peace enforcement, which is considered a strongly militarily-
oriented Chapter VII mandate.  The degree of force will be covered in the SHIRBRIG case study 
that specifies the Member state ?  UN relationship.   
 The rules of engagement is the amount of force that is allowable on a specific mission, 
ranging from unarmed peacekeepers where no combat is allowed to rules of engagement 
authorizing offensive action.  The rules of engagement will be covered in the Blackwater case 
study that specifies the NSA ?  Member state relationship.   
                                                        
46 Personal Interview with Michael Doyle, April 10, 2009. 
47 By appropriate Member state, this means a Member state which has an excellent peacekeeping record and fields 
peacekeepers as often as possible.  Potential candidates include the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Austria and the 
like. 
20 
CHAPTER 4. 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS FOR PRECEDENT 
 In this section, the paper will attempt to select cases from a universe of cases to shed 
further light on the theoretical possibilities of NSA-Member state negotiations and also the 
ability of Member states to pool resources for UN peacekeeping. 
Case Selection 
The universe of cases to choose from is relatively small due to the unique circumstances 
looked at in this paper.  The universe of cases should consist of a Member state hiring a PMC for 
security and military operations outside of its own country.  This limits the universe of cases to a 
very small number due to the fact that a large number of PMCs are hired to engage in internal 
security by either the government of a territory or by the rebel/insurgent groups of that country.  
The first set of cases that were looked at is the NSA?  Member state relationship.  The main 
issue with this first set of cases is the fact that most of these NSA?  Member state contracts are 
considered classified for security purposes by the Member state in question.  It is imperative to 
actually have the contract between the Member state and the NSA so that the exact concessions 
granted by both NSA and Member state are spelled out in said contract.  Simply observing the 
consequences of a NSA-Member state relationship are not enough due to the fact that it would be 
unknown whether those actions were within the bounds of the contract signed between the NSA 
and the Member state.  As stated in the literature review, there have been a number of Member 
states contracting out work ranging from guard and convoy duty to all out state security with a 
full-blown military.  Unfortunately, these NSAs are not publicly traded companies or 
corporations, and are therefore under no obligation to publicly release any records whatsoever.  
The Blackwater contract, on the other hand, was signed between Blackwater and the United 
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States government, and was therefore was eligible to be released under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FoIA).  This contract was also identical with contracts signed with Dyncorp 
and with Triple Canopy, showing that the contract signed wasn’t due specifically to a special 
relationship between the company and the policymakers but was instead a deliberate choice by 
the Member state.  Although parts of the contract are considered classified still, a large portion of 
the contract was obtained by the American press and was released to the general public, allowing 
for an analysis of the relationship of NSA?  Member state.   
 The second set of cases that were looked at is the Member state?  UN relationship.  The 
UN has signed a great number of special agreements with Member states under Article 43 which 
specifically deals with only that Member state (i.e. only one Member’s nationals) being handed 
over to the UNSC.  SHIRBRIG was established in 1995 through Letters of Intent between the 
constituent Member states.  This Letter of Intent was presented to the United Nations, and on 
September 2nd, 1997, Kofi Annan inaugurated the first meeting of SHIRBRIG’s Planning 
Element, showing that the UN was made aware of and approved of SHIRBRIG from the start of 
operations.48  The SHIRBRIG case deals with multiple countries (and multiple nationals) under 
one specific set of treaties being handed to the UN as one cohesive unit; this is the only case of a 
treaty series specifically setting up this concept and being successfully implemented, hence why 
this case was used for the second case study. 
General Case Study Questions to Ask 
 The two case studies that will be covered are: 
a) The contract signed between Blackwater, a PMC based in North Carolina, and 
the United States government during the Iraqi invasion from 2003-2007 49 and  
                                                        
48 http://www.unwatch.com/shirbrig.shtml 
49 Blackwater’s contract with the US government can be found at: http://r.m.upi.com/other/12216818791223.pdf 
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b) The series of treaties signed between Member states of the Multinational 
Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG).50 
 
For each case study, the same four questions will be answered, where X = the 
NSA (or in Case Study #2 the Member states) and Y = the Member State (or in Case 
Study #2 the UN): 
1) What contract stipulations did X specifically enter into with Y? 
2) What contract stipulations did Y specifically accede to when hiring X? 
3) Did X or Y include reservations for cancellations of said contract if either X 
or Y needed/wanted to opt out? 
4) How was accountability dealt with?  Was X’s employees/volunteers 
considered Y’s concern?  Why or why not? 
 
These four questions are asked of both case studies due to the fact that these four 
questions, when answered, map out the theoretical overlap required for the NSA and the Member 
state to actually intersect and possible reach a viable compromise.   
 
Case Study #1: X = Blackwater, Y = United States of America 
How does this case study help answer the main question? 
A logical parallel can be drawn from the experiences of the United States outsourcing its 
military operations in Iraq to Blackwater and other PMCs.  Although this case is not an accurate 
representation of the situation at hand, it could be considered analogous due to the fact that the 
                                                        
50 SHIRBRIG’s main series of treaties can be found at: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%202232/v2232.pdf 
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situation in question is the closest case study possible in recent history that could provide 
information.  Although the entrance of Blackwater into the arena of military force was 
considered a failure for the Iraqi war and subsequent occupation, lessons could be drawn from 
this study to illustrate the mistakes and attempt to repair those mistakes.   
This case study will cover the portions of the contract that specifically answer the four 
questions listed in the previous sections as it pertains to this paper.  This case study also shows 
the specific contractual obligations imposed by the Member state on the NSA and vice versa.  
This case study also shows the Rules of Engagement that a Member state would allow a NSA as 
discussed above in Chapter 3.  Although this is a for-profit NSA, this is the closest case study 
that information can be found on.  This case study is limited due to it being a for-profit NSA and 
also due to it dealing with only one Member state on a mission that did not involve the 
international community; however, this case study still can provide at least some guideposts to 
illuminate what is and is not permissible.  
 
Question 1: What contract stipulations did X specifically enter into with Y? 
 The contract signed between the NSA and the United States State Department goes into 
great detail about the specific stipulations the US State Department placed on the NSA.51  
According to Section C, Subsection 2, Clause 1: 
The Contractor shall provide the following types of services under this contract, and as further 
specified in each Task Order issued under this contract: 
1) Recruiting, screening, and selecting applicants for Protective Services (PRS) detail, 
and PRS support positions, 
2) Training of personal protective service and PRS support personnel, 
3) Recruit, train, and deploy local nationals/third country nationals for static details 
and/or PRS), 
4) Plan, manage and perform personal and facilities protective services details, 
                                                        
51 The contract actually refers to Blackwater, Triple Canopy and DynCorp, but each of these PMCs were tasked with 
the same responsibilities in the contract. 
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5) Mobile details, including walking, ground transportation, waterborne transportation, 
and airborne transportation (United States State Department, 2007).   
 
The NSA specifically agreed to provide “all qualified personnel, facilities, equipment, 
material and supplies necessary to accomplish the work under this contract and as further defined 
in each Task Order, except for that specifically identified in this contract as Government 
furnished”.52  The NSA’s operatives were required to file for and receive Top Secret Facility 
Clearance with the US State Department for the duration of the contract.53  The NSA was tasked 
with providing protection services for a 24-hour, seven-day week basis by providing armed, 
qualified protective services.54   
One of the key points of the NSA contract is the fact that the NSA was tasked to recruit, 
screen and train local national (LN) or third party nationals (TPN) in established protective 
security procedures.55  To facilitate this, the NSA was also contracted to provide any and all 
translation/interpretation services for communications between the NSA’s personnel and local 
government, police, military members and citizens.56  The NSA was held responsible for all 
logistical support required to perform its assigned tasks.57  This logistical support included not 
only purchase of all materials needed, but also maintenance and upkeep of transportation, 
clothing, food, and also weaponry.58   
Two appendices are worth noting here: Appendix C covers the general qualifications that 
the US State Department placed on American contractor personnel, whereas Appendix D covers 
the general qualifications that the US State Department placed on LN and TPN personnel.  The 
                                                        
52 Blackwater contract, Section C.2.2.1.   
53 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.1.5. 
54 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.2.1. 
55 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.2.2. 
56 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.5.1. 
57 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.8.1.1. 
58 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.8.2 & C.4.3.8.3. 
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only major difference between the two appendices is the fact that the US State Department 
reserves the right to deny any foreign national working under the contract.59 
 
Question 2: What contract stipulations did Y specifically accede to when hiring X? 
 The United States State Department allows for a great deal of negotiation room in the 
contract with the NSA.  The State Department agreed to allow the use of government property by 
the NSA to fulfill its duties in the field.60  The State Department agreed to provide all contractors 
(who were American citizens), with diplomatic passports if needed for the job at hand.61  The 
State Department allowed the NSA to create and implement its own applicant screening and 
selection process.62  Although the government reserved the right to inspect all training programs 
and facilities, the government did not require this in the contract, thereby making it a concession 
to the NSA.63  The State Department also gave the NSA the ability to recruit, screen and train 
LNs and TCNs as required by specific Task Orders.64  The State Department gave the NSA the 
ability to interpret/translate for itself when necessary or required for the job at hand.65  The State 
Department allowed the NSA to produce its own training programs for its contractors and 
guards.66  The NSA was allowed to keep its own inventories that were only checked once a year 
by the State Department, if at all.67  The State Department directly authorized the use of non-
                                                        
59 Blackwater contract, Appendix C and D. 
60 Blackwater contract, Section C.2.2.2. 
61 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.1.6. 
62 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.1.2. 
63 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.2.1. 
64 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.2.2. 
65 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.5.1. 
66 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.7.3. 
67 Blackwater contract, Section C.4.3.8.3. 
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lethal68 and lethal force69 by the NSA’s personnel, both with large lists of permissible and non 
permissible uses of said force.   
 
Question 3: Did X or Y include reservations for cancellations of said contract if either X or Y 
needed/wanted to opt out? 
 The State Department included clauses that specifically allow the US government to opt 
out of the contract.  This allowed the State Department to reevaluate its relationship with the 
NSA by evaluating the NSA at 6-month intervals.70  It is clear in the contract that both the NSA 
and the State Department had the ability to opt out of the contract but only after the evaluation 
period of 6 months wherein the State Department would offer the exact same contract to the 
NSA and the NSA could either sign or not. 
 
Question 4: How was accountability dealt with?  Was X’s employees/volunteers considered Y’s 
concern?  Why or why not? 
 Accountability is partially addressed in the contract between the NSA and the US 
government, specifically:  “The Contractor, including all Contractor-provided personnel, shall 
comply with all of the laws of the United States and the host countries in which they are required 
to provide services under this contract.”71  However, although the NSA is told to comply with all 
laws, there is no enforcement mechanism in the contract.  Although the rule of law is clearly 
spelled out in this portion of the contract, other forces are at work with respect to this particular 
case study.  The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued orders to the contrary when it 
                                                        
68 Blackwater contract, Pg. 72, Section 16. 
69 Blackwater contract, Pg. 72, Section 17. 
70 Blackwater contract, Section C.1.5.4. 
71 Blackwater Contract, Section C.4.1.8. 
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issued an order specifically granting immunity to any foreign national in Iraq.72  Although this 
order allows for the waiving of immunity by contractors, it was neither required nor enforced by 
this order or by the government in question.73  Due to these conflicting orders given to the NSA, 
the legal status of the NSA’s employees was very ambiguous for almost the entire duration of the 
NSA’s contract.  Only after the contract was not renewed in 2007 was the NSA’s employees 
actually prosecuted, but it must be noted that the NSA’s employees were prosecuted under 
American law (per the original contract), not Iraqi law where they were deployed.   
 
Significant stipulations garnered from case study 
 This case study shows a Member state clearly delegating a great deal of authority and 
power to a NSA which it has contracted out specific services to.  The NSA in question was given 
the ability to use force, both deadly and non-deadly.  The Member state allowed this NSA to 
engage in whatever activities it deemed necessary to achieve its objectives.  The Member State 
also attempted to hold the NSA to specific accountable standards, with mixed results.  Although 
there were a number of issues with this contract leading to it ultimately not being renewed, it is 
clear that this contract lays out some interesting issues that must be addressed for a NSA to give 
peacekeepers to a Member state. 74  The case study shows the possible implications and/or 
conditions that would be laid out by the Member state, but also shows that the NSA?  Member 
state relationship does contain enough common starting points to be viable.   
 
 
 
                                                        
72 Text fully accessible at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations.  Section 2, Clause 1. 
73 Ibid, Section 5, Clause 2. 
74 Specifically the question of accountability was one of the main reasons for the non-renewal of this contract. 
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Case Study #2: X = Signatories of SHIRBRIG series of treaties, Y = United Nations 
How does this case study help answer the main question? 
The second case study are the treaties signed between the member countries of the 
Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG), a fast response 
unit made up of Member States’ militaries dedicated to peacekeeping.  SHIRBRIG was created 
between the Member states of Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden 
with the explicit purpose of producing a brigade-strength military unit for rapid deployment at 
the command of the UNSC.  The treaty series was signed between these eighteen Members with 
the understanding with the UN that these troops would only be used for UN peacekeeping 
missions.  Again, although this is not an exact match for the scenario envisioned, this would 
provide another avenue of answering questions with respect to contract stipulations; i.e. what 
stipulations were included in the series of treaties that created SHIRBRIG, what reservations did 
the Member States make in these treaties, and also what stipulations (if any) did the United 
Nations itself place on this force.  Here, SHIRBRIG helps to explain the degree of force 
mentioned in Chapter 3 above: what kind of degree of force would be allocated to such an 
organization?  The main reason for including SHIRBRIG in this analysis is that although this is 
not an exact case study for the question involved, the case is relevant in the fact that SHIRBRIG 
has successfully worked with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and has 
successfully coordinated with said agency with respect to peacekeeping operations and also the 
fact that SHIRBRIG is a multinational coalition, specifically designed to interface with the UN 
peacekeeping system, allowing for a derivation of conditions required to work with UN 
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peacekeeping.  The main focus will be on three Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), signed 
between the Member states that comprise SHIRBRIG. 
 
Question 1: What contract stipulations did X specifically enter into with Y? 
 The Member states of SHIRBRIG specifically state: 
The SHIRBRIG will be available at high readiness and will be reserved for 
missions where rapid response is important, and where other forces cannot 
meet the United Nations’ requirements. The SHIRBRIG will only be 
employed on a case-by-case basis in a manner safe-guarding national 
sovereignty considerations in peacekeeping operations mandated by the 
Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, 
including humanitarian tasks. The SHIRBRIG, as an integral formation – i.e. 
consisting of elements from all types of arms, including manoeuvre units, 
medical, logistics and communications – will only be employed for 
deployments of up to 6 months duration, and it should not be considered for 
routine rotation of forces in connection with ongoing missions. As a general 
rule, force contributions for the SHIRBRIG will not be equipped for 
operations in extreme climates, e.g. arctic or alpine environments, severe 
desert, swamp and jungle areas. (United Nations, 1997).75 
 
 SHIRBRIG’s MOUs state that all units will be prepared for deployment within 21-30 
days upon their request from the United Nations.76  The Member states agree to work through the 
United Nations system with respect to logistical support for the brigade.77  The Member states 
agree that financial responsibilities will be negotiated with the United Nations before deployment 
of SHIRBRIG.78  The Member states agree to support the United Nations headquarters with 
operational planning at the tactical level and preparations involving the deployment of 
SHIRBRIG.79  The costs related to fact-finding missions requested by the UN are financed by 
                                                        
75 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 3.1. 
76 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 3.3. 
77 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 6.6. 
78 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 8.1. 
79 MOU, PLANELM, Section 4.1. 
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SHIRBRIG.80  The Member states of SHIRBRIG agree that decisions regarding force 
deployment are dealt with between nations in cooperation with the UN through established 
diplomatic procedures.81  As stated above, SHIRBRIG was to only be used on Chapter VI 
missions, including humanitarian missions for no more than 6 months.  SHIRBRIG also agreed 
to use English as the official language for the brigade even though English is not the official 
language of most of the Member states of SHIRBRIG.82  The Member states of SHIRBRIG also 
specifically state that SHIRBRIG is intended to only be deployed by the UNSC, and not by any 
national military.83  The Member states agreed when SHIRBRIG was deployed to place 
SHIRBRIG under the command of the UN Force Commander who was appointed by the UNSC. 
 
Question 2: What contract stipulations did Y specifically accede to when hiring X? 
 The United Nations agreed to cover the costs of all SHIRBRIG in the field.84  The United 
Nations agreed to help cover logistical costs and supplies with agreements signed.85  The United 
Nations agreed to take the peacekeepers offered by SHIRBRIG under SHIRBRIG’s conditions; 
i.e. the peacekeepers offered by SHIRBRIG were taken all at once or not at all.86  The UNSC 
would recommend how many peacekeepers were needed at times, but on other occasions 
SHIRBRIG would offer what they thought would be a logical number of peacekeepers and the 
UNSC would accede to that number.  During deployment, the United Nations agreed to pay for 
and adjudicate claims with respect to damages while on deployment.87  The United Nations also 
                                                        
80 MOU, PLANELM, Section 8.6. 
81 MOU, Steering Committee SHIRBRIG, Section 6.1. 
82 MOU, Steering Committee SHIRBRIG, Section 5.1. 
83 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 3.1. 
84 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 9.1. 
85 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 6.5. 
86 Specifically, SHIRBRIG offered the UNSC X number of peacekeepers, and the UNSC either accepted or 
declined. 
87 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 9.3. 
31 
agreed to Status of Forces agreements with the Member states of SHIRBRIG88, and also agreed 
to allow for a representative of SHIRBRIG to have consultative status with the UNSC during 
deployment.89  The UNSC also acknowledged that SHIRBRIG was a multinational brigade with 
similar training and deployment standards.  SHIRBRIG was also to be flagged in the field as UN 
troops, not as the individual Member state’s troops. 
 
Question 3: Did X or Y include reservations for cancellations of said contract if either X or Y 
needed/wanted to opt out? 
 Although no specific contract section deals with cancellation between the UN and the 
Member states, there are provisions for Member states to pull out if necessary.90  The UNSC 
always had the option to simply refuse to take the peacekeepers provided by SHIRBRIG, but this 
option was never exercised by the UNSC.   
 
Question 4: How was accountability dealt with?  Was X’s employees/volunteers considered Y’s 
concern?  Why or why not? 
 Accountability was dealt with in Section 10 of the main SHIRBRIG MOU.  In Section 
10, each participant exercises judicial authority over its own nationals.  The SHIRBRIG MOU 
also states in Section 10 that the peacekeepers are accountable only to the Member states of 
SHIRBRIG, not to the United Nations.  Although when SHIRBRIG was deployed it was only 
deployed on UNSC missions and considered UN personnel while deployed, ultimate jurisdiction 
laid with the peacekeeper’s Member state. 
 
                                                        
88 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 6.4. 
89 UN Charter, Article 44. 
90 MOU, SHIRBRIG, Section 11.3. 
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Significant stipulations garnered from case study 
 Here a multinational brigade91 was clearly set up to give the UNSC the ability to rapidly 
deploy a ready-made force on short notice for Chapter VI missions.92  SHIRBRIG was treated by 
the UNSC as one, unified unit and was not split apart.  The UNSC made it clear that it would 
accept peacekeepers from a multinational brigade.  Therefore, the UNSC clearly accepted 
peacekeepers from a coalition of Member states wherein the Member states specifically created 
said coalition for the UN, a situation that a NSA would clearly be interested in repeating.  
Another key point here is the fact that the UN flagged the Member state’s peacekeepers as UN 
troops, not as Member state’s troops.  This shows that the UN was taking responsibility for the 
Member states’ troops on the ground by flagging them as UN troops.   
 
                                                        
91 Brigade strength = approximately 5000 peacekeepers. 
92 Also with respect to Chapter VI missions, SHIRBRIG was rapidly expanded after the initial set of negotiations to 
Chapter VI ½ missions after initial deployments. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
OVERLAP OF CONDITIONS 
 To combine these two case studies, it would be logical to go over the theoretical overlap 
of the NSA and the theoretical overlap of the Member state. 
 The graph, demonstrated below, maps out the theoretical overlap between a NSA and a 
Member state.  The X-axis is the degree of force that would be needed for the peacekeeping 
mission at hand, whereas the Y-axis would be the rules of engagement agreed upon for a 
mission.  The X-axis extends from 0 to 4: 
 0: Preventive diplomacy, which involves confidence-building measures, fact-finding, 
early warning to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects of peaceful settlement, 
which is considered a Chapter VI mandate and usually involves unarmed peacekeepers; 
 1: Peacekeeping, which is considered a confidence building measure to monitor a truce 
between parties while diplomats attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty, which is 
considered a Chapter VI mandate and involves either unarmed or lightly armed peacekeepers; 
 2: Peacemaking, which is designed to bring hostile parties to agreement, which is 
considered to be a “Chapter VI ½“ mandate dealing with lightly armed peacekeepers involved in 
more strenuous situations; 
 3: Post-conflict reconstruction, which is designed to reconstruct infrastructure with the 
expressed aim of preventing future violence and laying the foundation for a durable peace, which 
is considered to also be a Chapter VI ½ mandate which deals with more heavily armed 
peacekeepers with a long-term commitment to the mission and 
 4: Peace enforcement, which is designed to act with or without the consent of the parties 
in order to ensure compliance of a cease-fire, which is considered to be a Chapter VII mandate 
34 
which deals with heavily armed peacekeepers operated under the direction of the Secretary-
General.93   
The Y-axis shows the rules of engagement for a mission with the axis going from 0 to 4: 
 0: No rules of engagement whatsoever;94 
 1: Rules of engagement authorizing self-defense only; 
 2: Rules of engagement authorizing robust self-defense;95 
 3: Rules of engagement authorizing robust self-defense and defense of others,96 and 
 4: Rules of engagement authorizing offensive action.97 
 
 Figure 1. Degree of Force vs. Rules of Engagement Theoretical Overlap 
                                                        
93 All of these definitions are lifted directly from Doyle, pgs. 10-11 which were in turn derived from An Agenda for 
Peace. 
94 This would be in essence an unarmed force which lacks the authority to use any force whatsoever.   
95 Robust self-defense would be the ability to defend oneself and take proactive measures towards defending 
oneself; i.e. patrolling, police work, etc. 
96 Defense of others includes civilians, other NGOs, VIPs, etc. 
97 This would be considered what a standard military would do, destruction of enemies, capture of territory, etc. 
35 
The case studies show the limits of where the NSA and the Member state would be.  The 
Member state can use any and all degrees of force it sees fit, leading to it to be placed from 0 to 4 
on the scale.  The Member state also has the ability to gain and use whatever rules of 
engagement as it sees fit; therefore, it receives a score on the scale from 0 to 4, filling the entire 
theoretical overlap.   
 The NSA, according to the case studies, would only be able to have a small amount of 
force delegated to it, and would therefore receive a 2 on the degree of force scale.  With respect 
to rules of engagement, the case studies show that Member states would relatively easy allow 
access up to a 2 on the rules of engagement scale.  However, a non-profit NSA could 
theoretically have more leeway with respect to negotiations as discussed below, and this leads to 
the second NSA theoretical overlap wherein the NSA gains a 3 on the degree of force scale and a 
3 on the rules of engagement scale. 
 
Theoretical Overlap 
Preventive Diplomacy 
Preventive diplomacy is considered a Chapter VI operation which are covered by the 
SHIRBRIG treaties.  Therefore the Member state ?  UN arrow is valid given the case study in 
question: SHIRBRIG specifically stated that Chapter VI operations were valid under that series 
of treaties.  The NSA ?  Member state case study also shows that preventive diplomacy 
operations were specifically delegated to the NSA: Blackwater was clearly tasked with fact-
finding missions and early warning patrols.  This would correspond to a Rules of Engagement 
rating of either 0 or 1 and a Degree of Force rating of 0, which is covered by both the Member 
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state and the NSA.  Therefore, there is a theoretical possibility that the relationship NSA ?  
Member state ?  UN is valid in this case.   
From a realistic standpoint, a preventive diplomacy Chapter VI operation would be an 
excellent starting point for a NSA as the peacekeepers involved would be either unarmed or 
lightly armed at most, and would not be expected to engage in any defensive or offensive 
measures.  The main issue with SHIRBRIG and Member states supporting peacekeeping troops 
is the large drain of resources for rapid deployment, leading to the ad hoc system currently used 
by the UNSC to garner and deploy peacekeepers.  A NSA would be able to rapidly deploy 
unarmed or lightly armed, well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers relatively quickly with 
no cost to the Member states or the United Nations except for the contract stipulations listed 
above, making this option particularly viable for the UN and Member states to outsource this 
particular type of peacekeeping operations.  A case can also be made for a NSA to help 
coordinate other NGOs on the ground, allowing for greater efficiency for all NGOs involved in 
the diplomatic discourse that would take place in this type of mission. 
 
Peacekeeping98 
Peacekeeping operations are considered Chapter VI operations and are usually considered 
long-term commitments for the peacekeepers involved.  This is again clearly covered in the 
SHIRBRIG treaties, as SHIRBRIG was delegated for Chapter VI missions only.  The NSA ?  
Member state case study also shows that peacekeeping operations were specifically delegated to 
the NSA: Blackwater was clearly tasked with missions that are consistent with UN peacekeeping 
under Chapter VI mandates.  This would correspond to a Rules of Engagement rating of 1 (or in 
rare circumstances 2) and a Degree of Force rating of 1 on the chart, which is covered by both 
                                                        
98 Chapter VI ½, usually deals with long term missions. 
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the Member state and the NSA.  Therefore, there is a theoretical possibility that the relationship 
NSA ?  Member state ?  UN is valid in this case.   
 From a realistic standpoint, a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission would again be an 
excellent starting place for a relationship between a NSA and a Member state.  Chapter VI 
peacekeeping missions usually do not require the authorization of anything above self defense, 
hence the 1, perhaps 2, rating on the rules of engagement.  The same issue of rapid deployment 
discussed in preventive diplomacy can be reiterated here: the ad hoc structure of the UNSC 
precludes rapid deployment and a NSA could easily alleviate this problem by simply having the 
peacekeepers ready for rapid deployment for peacekeeping missions.  As peacekeeping is on a 
similar footing with respect to preventive diplomacy, it would be logical to state that the ability 
of the NSA to coordinate with other NGOs in the field would be another argument in the rapid 
deployment of the NSA by the Member state.  As above, an argument could be logically made 
that a NSA would be able to rapidly deploy unarmed or lightly armed, well-trained and well-
equipped peacekeepers relatively quickly with no cost to the Member states or the United 
Nations except for the contract stipulations listed above, making this option particularly viable 
for the UN and Member states to outsource this particular type of peacekeeping operations.   
 
Peace Making 
Peace making situations are considered Chapter VI ½ mandates and are also considered 
long-term commitments.  SHIRBRIG was indeed designed for Chapter VI ½ mandates; however, 
SHIRBRIG was not designed for long-term deployments which a peace making mission usually 
is.  Because of this, the Member state ?  UN is theoretically supported for peace making, but 
only in the short term unless the NSA in question was able to deploy for a long-term 
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commitment.  The use of force on the first case study is only for self-defense purposes; however, 
as discussed in the previous section, there is a bit of leeway with respect to how the US State 
Department deployed Blackwater, so this could still be a theoretical possibility.  These missions 
can possibly involve the use of lethal force if necessary.  This corresponds to a Rules of 
Engagement score of 2 (perhaps 3 depending on the mandate) and a Degree of Force score of 2; 
leading to a theoretical overlap.  Therefore the NSA?  Member State?  UN relationship is 
theoretically possible. 
 From a realistic standpoint, a Chapter VI ½ peace enforcement mission would have 
almost the same advantages listed above for the NSA: rapid deployment, NGO coordination if 
possible, and the fact that the supplies, equipment and volunteers would be no drain on the UN 
system.  For a peace enforcement mission, however, there is an additional incentive for a NSA to 
effectively engage in this type of mission: the timetable in question.  Peace enforcement missions 
are usually long-term commitments of large numbers of peacekeepers, a fact that the UNSC is all 
too aware as it attempts to scrape peacekeepers together for not only new missions, but also for 
older missions of this nature to continue operations.  A properly structured NSA could solve this 
problem due to the simple fact that a NSA only has one “domestic constituency”: its donors.  
Given the fact that the donors of the NSA in question would be donating specifically for 
missions of this nature, it would be logical to assume that these missions would be the most 
logical place for the NSA to deploy to.  Member states would be able to rightfully state that they 
are helping the international community with no cost to themselves, and the Member state would 
not have to appease any domestic constituency with respect to cost and resources for a long-term 
commitment as the only commitment the Member state is making is simply renewing its support 
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of the NSA.  The NSA in turn is able to fulfill its stated objectives of providing the UN with 
well-trained, well-equipped peacekeepers at no cost to the international community.   
 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Post-conflict reconstruction is considered a long term, much more robust Chapter VI ½ 
mandate involving a large number of peacekeepers involved in rebuilding infrastructure, 
disarmament of factions, and other military operations.  These missions usually involve the use 
of lethal force if necessary.  This corresponds to a Rules of Engagement score of 2 or 3 
depending on mandate and a Degree of Force score of 3; leading to a very small theoretical 
overlap.99  Although the NSA?  Member State ?  UN is theoretically possible, the very small 
theoretical overlap shows that this is highly unlikely. 
From a realistic standpoint, a Chapter VI ½ post-conflict reconstruction mission would 
have almost the same advantages listed above for the NSA: rapid deployment, NGO coordination 
if possible, and the fact that the supplies, equipment and volunteers would be no drain on the UN 
system.  The timetable issue above would again help the NSA with respect to its lack of a 
domestic constituency as again the Member state would be “free-riding” the NSA for increased 
international prestige.  However, this type of UN peacekeeping has a serious disadvantage 
inherent for the NSA: specifically, the number of peacekeepers that would be required for a long-
term commitment.  Post-conflict reconstruction requires large numbers of peacekeepers; far 
above the brigade strength of SHIRBRIG.  A NSA could in theory field that number of 
peacekeepers, but the chances of this are highly unlikely.  If anything, the NSA would have to 
                                                        
99 More often than not, these missions would have a Rules of Engagement rating of 3 but there have been 
exceptions. 
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work with Member states and be a portion of the peacekeepers sent, but could never fully run the 
peacekeeping operation in question unlike above. 
 
Peace Enforcement100 
Peace enforcement situations are considered Chapter VII mandates and are also 
considered long-term commitments.  Indeed, peace enforcement is usually placed under Article 
42 of the Charter, which allows the UNSC to order any kind of military action for the situation in 
question.  Because of this, both arrows are in jeopardy for this situation.  SHIRBRIG was not 
designed for Chapter VII mandates; therefore, the Member state ?  UN is not theoretically 
supported for peace making.  Also due to the fact that peace enforcement would require a larger 
number of peacekeepers than simply brigade strength, this case study shows the inadequacy of 
attempting to fulfill Chapter VII mandates with SHIRBRIG.  By the same coin, the use of force 
on the first case study is only for self-defense purposes; this makes the NSA ?  Member state 
relationship also highly unlikely.  Also, an NSA would simply not have the capability to deploy 
the numbers of peacekeepers required to actually engage in this type of operation.  On the chart, 
this would lead to a Rules of Engagement rating of 4 and a Degree of Force rating of 4.  There is 
no overlap space at this point; therefore, peace enforcement does not have the theoretical backing 
of the case studies in question.   
 
                                                        
100 This would be considered a “hard” Chapter VII mandate; i.e. a very large militarily-oriented mandate. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis is to ascertain the answer to the question proposed at the 
beginning: i.e. could a Member State actually take volunteers from a non-state actor to fulfill its 
requirements under the United Nations Charter?  Given the available data, there is a possibility 
that the conditions in question could be met by both sides leading to more productive UN 
peacekeeping missions.   
To summarize: 
?  Preventive Diplomacy: Theoretically possible according to the case studies. 
?  Peacekeeping: Theoretically possible according to the case studies. 
?  Peace Making: Theoretically possible according to the case studies. 
?  Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Theoretically possible, but highly unlikely according to 
the case studies and the slim theoretical overlap. 
?  Peace Enforcement: Not theoretically possible according to the case studies. 
It must be stated again here that this is a hypothetical paper at this point in time. This 
paper is intended to show that with the existence of certain factors, a cooperative peacekeeping 
agreement could be reached among two or more given actors; i.e. it is in the realm of possibility.  
It does not imply in any way that this will or should happen. Indeed, with the international 
security system as it is currently, innovative solutions must at the very least be explored in order 
for a more secure future to be possible.  
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